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1. Introduction: Empirical work in Argumentation Theory 
A position that undergirds Tomasi’s paper on the study of judgments in legal arguments I quote 
directly from Tomasi: “Ethos and pathos are not in the ‘suburbs’ of cognition and are not an 
alternative route: logos ethos and pathos are not alternative or parallel ways of persuasion but 
interlaced” (p. 9). Argument-making and argument-having is complex. Theorists like Brockriede 
(1975), Willard (1978), Gilbert (1994), and Hample (2005) - among others - put forward theories 
that recognize the social aspects of argument, the arguers. In this paper Tomasi describes and 
explains the parameters around an empirical research project that investigates to what extent 
emotion influences judges’ final decisions in legal arguments. The is a project that also 
emphasizes social aspects (i.e. emotion) involved in arguments. As the term emotion is 
widespread, Tomasi first articulates important criteria of emotion and related concepts. Then the 
author concentrates on the epistemic feelings of judges. Tomasi ends the paper with an 
explanation of the connections between legal arguments and epistemic feelings. Tomasi’s paper 
recognizes the layers of complexity in the process of argument-making.  
 I applaud the empirical efforts of this project, as it is important for the field of 
argumentation to develop theories validated by real arguments. I share the following responses 
to Tomasi’s paper, in an effort to broaden the conversation generally in a helpful way (i.e. more 
about argumentation theory generally, and less about particular arguments made in legal cases). 
First, there are critiques of science that have explained the impossibility of neutrality in human 
decision-making. These works corroborate Tomasi’s point that judges’ legal arguments cannot 
be based on, or assessed with, solely rationality - this is simply insufficient (Tomasi, p. 4). 
Second, I demonstrate how implicitly inferring epistemic feelings function similarly to 
conversational implicatures in conversations and enthymemes in argument. I end with a 
discussion of the potential idealism that may be apparent in acknowledging and working with 
epistemic feelings in argumentation. This has nothing to do with Tomasi’s ideas, and more to do 
with our culture’s detachment from emotion. A sense of awareness is expected when 
investigating epistemic feelings that perhaps is not simple, or inherent, for some individuals 
(judges or researchers for that matter). Overall, this investigation contributes value to the 
argumentation literature, and especially to emotion in argument.  
 
2. A Judge is not superman 
I borrow some criteria about argument from Brockriede (1975) that, I think, supports Tomasi’s 
research agenda. Brockriede states that arguments can be found in the vicinity of people (1975, 
p. 179); succinctly put, they are a social activity. Arguments occur because some x needs to be 
  
solved or justified, and arguments are based on perceptions arguers have (Brockriede, 1975, p. 
181 ). This depiction of argument drives home the point that neutral stances, or arguments 
following normative parameters or expectations, are not always practical. In fact, a study of 
arguments made by people will likely shed light on how argumentative decisions, or claims, are 
influenced in large by aspects of the arguer (e.g. arguer bias, arguer experience, arguer-selected 
research, etc.). Tomasi begins her paper by questioning the extent to which judges may be 
influenced by the emotions displayed by others in a court case (p. 1). In essence, if judges are 
influenced by emotional displays in the context of a legal case (and why wouldn’t they be? They 
are humans, not superman), then to what extent are judges’ perceptions being shaped by what 
they hear? 
 I offer a parallel analogy related to knowledge construction. Feminist epistemologists, for 
example, question the knowledge scientists rely on to make decisions in their empirical research 
- from deciding what to study, how to study it, how to analyze findings from a study, etc. (see 
Longino, 1990; Fricker, 2000; among others). If different cultural contexts, social conditions, 
educational backgrounds, and so on give rise to (obviously) diverse belief systems and 
worldviews, then it follows that decisions within the realm of science originate from particular 
people and their particular choices. That a scientist decides to study a, and not b; that a scientist 
has hypothesis c and not d or e; that a scientist uses methodology f; all these choices that are 
executed may be derived from intuition, not neutral knowledge. And, yet, a point the 
epistemologists above referenced make is that these findings are generalized and then 
extrapolated as universal knowledge. 
 Knowledge is multi-dimensional, diverse, and we do not all have access to the same 
knowledge. While the critiques of science are for the purpose of illuminating the exclusion of 
particular voices and experiences in the construction of knowledge, the point is relevant to 
judges’ decision-making. Judges experience their own situatedness - this does not disappear 
when they assume the role of judge. Others involved in the court systems also speak, and present 
views, from their limited situatedness. This is not a criticism, but rather an observation. How 
judges are influenced by others in their legal arguments involves these epistemological 
processes, and often implicitly. If these critiques of epistemology are not enough to support the 
process of emotions influencing judges’ legal arguments, de Sousa (1987, 2009) claims that 
emotions play a crucial role in rational decision-making (p. 139).  
 
3. Epistemic feelings as a variation of an enthymeme in argument  
To quickly summarize epistemic feelings, Tomasi references de Sousa’s four categories: wonder, 
doubt, certainty, and familiarity (p. 3). These feelings lie below the surface of conscious 
deliberation, and they guide evaluative appraisals (de Sousa, 2009, p. 140). While they guide us 
in such intellectual activity, epistemic feelings are intuitive in nature (Tomasi, p. 4). Sometimes 
we may be aware of our epistemic feelings, and other times they become explicit because some 
subsequent event or thought occurs. This is Tomasi’s point - a judge may not be aware of his/her 
epistemic feelings, though they can be inferred from his/her judgments. In the study of the Court 
of Appeal in Trento Tomasi describes, judges would be interviewed on their reactions to the 
parties’ speeches.  
 Grice discusses the concept of a conversational implicature (1975), which aids 
individuals conversing to fill-in-the-blanks that are left out of conversation. A conversational 
implicature is not explicit to a listener in a conversation, but s/he understands the meaning 
intended by a speaker if each participant in the conversation is abiding by the cooperative 
  
principle and implying meanings intended. We have a similar mechanism in arguments - 
enthymemes. Missing components of arguments are obvious to arguer and audience, even if they 
are never explicit. In fact, an arguer him/herself may need to think about whether, and what, 
enthymemes are present in his/her own argument. It is possible that epistemic feelings work 
analogously to conversational implicatures and enthymemes - they are obvious, if unmentioned, 
components of a judge’s decision, just as conversational implicatures and enthymemes are 
obvious but implicit to audiences. The interviews of judges in the research study Tomasi 
discusses function as a methodology for helping us flesh out our emotions related to evaluative 
appraisals. The questions help us fill-in-the-blanks in a culture where we are removed, or 
distanced, from emotion (i.e. valuing, studying, emulating logic and rational processes over other 
sub-personal processes). The point that I make here is that the process Tomasi describes already 
has accepted terminology and methodology in conversation and arguments, where what is 
implicit can be made discursive. Perhaps we can use a parallel method for filling-in-the-blanks 
for what is intuitive in the development of legal arguments (or arguments in general). This is 
more challenging than it sounds, of course.  
 
4. Cultural shift with respect to emotion  
It is particularly challenging to be aware of how one is affected by others’ emotion, how it 
influences the audience’s thoughts and decisions, because emotion itself is rather elusive, or an 
unpracticed mode of being, at least in Western culture. If we rely on value-hierarchical thinking 
(i.e. thinking that subscribes to rational normative frameworks) then we are trained to develop, 
access, respond to, etc. thoughts in a discursive manner (Warren 1988) rather than with 
emotional awareness. Quite frankly we are out of our element when it comes to truly 
understanding, using, receiving our emotions. And, so, it is quite conceivable that judges’ 
decisions can be influenced by their responses to parties’ speeches in a legal framework.  
 My concerns lie with the challenges in uncovering epistemic feelings, even if guided by 
questions. There may be individuals who are distanced from emotions, or who may not know 
how to articulate how they are affected by others. Cognitive behavioural therapy is a therapy 
process that can help individuals change their thought patterns once they come to an 
understanding of interlinking patterns of thinking, behaving, and feeling. For example if a judge 
believes that socio-economic factors - which are uncontrollable - can influence individuals to 
steal (thought), then a judge may compensate for being in a middle-class social bracket by 
donating money to panhandlers (behaviour), and the judge may feel more care towards thieves 
on trial compared to other judges (feeling). Making a judgment based on an emotional speech 
can play a role in how such a judge reacts in specific cases. It takes time to recognize knowledge 
of these processes, but it does not follow that it is impossible. 
 Tomasi shares some of the questions asked of judges (pp. 6-7), recognizing that judges 
may be analyzing their behaviour, thoughts, and feelings - and so the questions focus on the facts 
of the case that are related to epistemic feelings. The study relies on the responses to fact-based 
questions to infer emotions that influence decisions. Tomasi shares that a subsequent study 
would ask judges explicit questions related to emotions as reasons for decisions and associated 
epistemic feelings (p. 7). I am a bit weary of how to analyze judges’ answers to even the factual 
questions. For example, one question asks whether something disturbed the judge while the 
parties spoke. If a judge answers with low, or moderate, or high - how does this connect with 
epistemic feelings? What are we inferring? How do we know if the judge him/herself knows if 
they were disturbed? Do we need a definition of what it means to be disturbed? This type of 
  
study requires an audience, and perhaps even researchers, with a sense of unskewed awareness. 
This in itself oxymoronic, though, as the goal of the study is to help uncover implicit processes 
with emotion that judges remain unaware of.  
 
5. Conclusion: You know it because you feel it 
 There are theorists who have discussed emotion in argument (Gilbert, 1994; Plantin 2004, 
2011; Ben-Ze’ev, 1995; Walton, 1992; and so on). Tomasi takes the discussion of emotion in a 
particular direction with respect to judges’ decisions, and Plantin (2011) is referenced. Ben-
Ze’ev (1995) may also help this endeavour, as he states that emotions have cognitive, evaluative, 
motivational, and feeling aspects. They are considered different aspects of a single state. For 
Ben-Ze’ev emotions can be reasons for a conclusion rendered. Analogously, a judge’s legal 
argument can be influenced similarly by his/her emotional state (even if not explicit to the judge 
him/herself) with these four criteria of emotion in the background. Epistemic feelings, like Ben-
Ze’ev’s account of an emotional argument, can be functional in that they aid judges in making 
decisions.  
 I await the results of the study, not because I do not trust emotions are indeed affective, in 
that “you know something because you feel that” (Tomasi, p. 9) but because the analyzed data 
would i) help us visualize and understand the connections of pathos, emotion, and decision-
making, ii) shine a light on subjects’ perceptions and self-awareness; iii) tell us if whether the 
analysis of data (who analyzes and how are they analyzing it) needs to be revisited. The latter 
two remain concerns fo me, though I expect they can be addressed.  
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